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CASE COMMENTS
JOINT REPRESENTATION OF DEFENDANTS VIOLATES
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978)
The United States Supreme Court in Holloway v. Arkansas' clarified
the remedy for violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel aris-
ing from representation by one attorney of multiple defendants with
conflicting interests.
An Arkansas state court appointed one attorney to represent three
codefendants.' Defendants' attorney claimed that he would be unable
to represent the codefendants effectively because of his receipt of confi-
dential information. The court, however, denied three different mo-
tions for appointment of separate counsel.' Defendants'convictions for
1. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
2. Id. at 477.
3. Id. The court held a hearing three weeks before trial on a motion to appoint separate
counsel and a motion for separate trials. No transcript of the proceeding exists. Id.
Before the jury was chosen, defense counsel reviewed the objection to joint representation, stat-
ing that "one or two of the defendants may testify and, if they do, then I will not be able to cross-
examine them because I have received confidential information from them." Holloway v. State,
260 Ark, 250, 262, 539 S.W.2d 435, 442 (Byrd, J., dissenting). The judge again denied the motion,
replying: "I don't know why you wouldn't.' Id. at 263, 539 S.W.2d at 442.
Finally, after the prosecution concluded its case, defense counsel engaged in the following collo-,
quy with the judge:
"Now, since I have been appointed, I had previously filed a motion asking the Court
to appoint a separate attorney for each defendant because of a possible conflict of inter-
est This conflict will probably be now coming up since each one of them wants to
testifry.
"THE COURT: That's all right; let them testify. There is no conflict of interest.
Every time I try more than one person in this court each one blames it on the other one.
"MR. HALL: I have talked to each one of these defendants, and I have talked to them
individually, not collectively.
"THE COURT: Now talk to them collectively." The court then indicated satisfaction
that each petitioner understood the nature and consequences of his right to testify on his
own behalf, whereupon Hall observed.
"I am in a position now where I am more or less muzzled as to any cross-examination.
"THE COURT: You have no right to cross-examine your own witness.
"MR. HALL: Or to examine them.
"THE COURT: You have a right to examine them, but have no right to cross-ex-
amine them. The prosecuting attorney does that.
"MR. HALL: If one [defendant] takes the stand, somebody needs to protect the other
two's interest while that one is testifying, and I can't do that since I have talked to each
one individually.
"THE COURT: Well, you have talked to them, I assume, individually and collec-
Washington University Open Scholarship
236 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1979:235
robbery and rape were affirmed on appeal.4  The United States
Supreme Court reversed and held Failure of the trial court after
timely objections by the defense to appoint separate counsel, or to as-
certain whether the risk of conflict of interests was too remote to war-
rant separate counsel, violates the sixth amendment assurance of
assistance of counsel and requires automatic reversal.5
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution6 guarantees
"effective assistance of counsel"7 to defendants in every federal crimi-
nal prosecution.' Gideon v. Wainwright9 extended this right to state
court defendants under the fourteenth amendment,' 0 concluding that
tively, too. They all say they want to testify. I think it's perfectly alright for them to
testify if they want to, or not. It's their business.
"Each defendant said he wants to testify, and there will be no cross-examination of
these witnesses, just a direct examination by you.
"MR. HALL: Your Honor, I can't even put them on direct examination because if I
ask them-
"THE COURT: (interposing) You can just put them on the stand and tell the Court
that you have advised them of their rights and they want to testify; then you tell the man
to go ahead and relate what he wants to. That's all you need to do."
435 U.S. at 478-80.
Defense counsel was concerned that the testimony of each defendant would incriminate the
other two, because all three desired to testify. The conflict of interests arose because counsel could
not protect the incriminated defendants with cross-examination, as would have been possible if a
different attorney represented each defendant. In addition, counsel wished to avoid the presenta-
tion of testimony that contradicted information obtained from client interviews. Id. at 480 & n.4.
4. Id. at 481.
5. Id. at 484.
6. U.S. CON ST. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assist-
ance of Counsel for his defense.
7. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). See White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945);
Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a
Groundfor Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U. L. REv. 289, 293-95 (1964).
8. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938).
9. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 747 (1964).
10. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
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Number 1] EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
the right to counsel is "essential to a fair trial."' "I Ineffective assistance
of counsel is possible when one attorney represents multiple defendants
in the same trial;' 2 defendants might be deprived of the "undivided
loyalty of counsel. ... , [and] counsel. . . [may] 'slight the defense of
one for that of another.' "'13
The Supreme Court first faced the constitutional implications ofjoint
representation in 1942 in Glasser v. United States,'4 a conspiracy case.
The Court held that the trial judge violated defendant's right to effec-
tive counsel when he ordered defendant's attorney to represent a code-
fendant with conflicting interests, 5 thus compromising defendant's
representation.' 6 Justice Murphy wrote that when such a conflict ex-
ists, a showing of prejudice is unnecessary. 17 While the Court over-
turned Glasser's conviction because his counsel did not give effective
11. 372 U.S. at 340.
12. Robinson v. Housewright, 525 F.2d 988, 992 (7th Cir. 1975). See Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (1968) (intangible prejudicial factor in joint representation is possible from guilt by
association through fact of common counsel); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (same); Pe-
terson v. Estelle, 446 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1971) (conflict exists where exculpatory statements of one
defendant incriminate another); Baker v. Wainwright, 422 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1970) (same); Sawyer
v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1966) (inconsistent pleas by defendants indicate per se conflict of
interests); Platts v. Myers, 253 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (same); Finer, Inefective Assistance of
Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077 (1973); Note, Conflict of Interests in Criminal Proceedings, 23
ARK. L. REV. 250, 254-55 & nn.14-20 (1969).
13. Sanchez v. Nelson, 446 F.2d 849, 850 (9th Cir. 1971) (quoting Peek v. United States, 321
F.2d 934, 944 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954 (1964)). See People v. Odom, 236 Cal.
App. 2d 876, 878-79, 46 Cal. Rptr. 453, 454-55 (1965); Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal
Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62
MINN. L. REV. 119 (1978): "[I]n every case of multiple representation there exists a likelihood, if
not a certainty, that the strategic maneuvers of the criminal defense attorney will adversely affect
the interests of at least one defendant at some point in the trial process." Id. at 136.
14. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
15. Witnesses testified that Kretske, a codefendant, took money to "fix" the impending case
against the witnesses. During the testimony Glasser's name was frequently mentioned with regard
to the payments. The attorney for Glasser and Kretske, in order to protect Kretske from further
"lies," did not cross-examine these witnesses. Cross-examination was necessary to remove the
implication that Glasser was involved. Id. at 72-75.
16. Id. at 76. In Glasser the Court found that the appointment of Glasser's retained attorney
to represent a codefendant rendered Glasser's defense "not as effective as it might have been if the
appointment had not been made. . . [Tihe court thereby denied Glasser his right to have the
effective assistance of counsel." Id.
17. The view of the Glasser majority follows: "To determine the precise degree of prejudice
sustained by Glasser. . . is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the assistance of
counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from its denial." Id. at 75-76.
18. Id. at 76. See note 15 supra.
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service,' 8 Glasser's codefendants could not rely on the same error to
obtain reversal because of the peculiar nature of a conspiracy trial, in
which each codefendant must show prejudice. 19
The resulting ambiguity led the courts to differ for thirty-six years
about the standards for reversal of a conviction challenged on joint rep-
resentation grounds. Because the Glasser majority did not define "con-
flicting interests" 20 in terms of degree, some appellate courts demand
evidence of a definite conflict of defendants' interests; 2 ' others insist
upon a showing of "substantial possibility"2 2 of conflict; and still others
require only "a possible conflict of interest."23 Furthermore, many
courts do not limit Justice Murphy's discussion of prejudice to its fac-
tual setting-a conspiracy trial.24 Thus, "actual prejudice" must be
shown in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits;25 "conflict of interests" and
"prejudice" are synonymous in the First and Second Circuits, where a
19. "[W]here error as to one defendant in a conspiracy case requires that a new trial be
granted him, the rights of his co-defendants to a new trial depend upon whether that error
prejudiced them." 315 U.S. at 76-77 (citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925)). See
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Rossi v. United States, 278 F. 349
(9th Cir. 1922); BeIfi v. United States, 259 F. 822 (3d Cir. 1919); Browne v. United States, 145 F. I
(2d Cir. 1905); Dufour v. United States, 37 App. D.C. 497 (1911).
20. 315 U.S. at 76. The Court said that counsel should not "concurrently represent interests
which might diverge from those of his first client." Id.
21. United States v. Kutas, 542 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1976) (coconspirators convicted of
harboring and concealing escaped federal prisoner; defendant has burden of proving that joint
representation created conflict of interests; defendant did not object at trial), cer. denied, 429 U.S.
1073 (1977); United States v. Mari, 526 F.2d 117, 119 (2d Cir. 1975) (defendants convicted of
extortionate extension of credit; no objection to joint representation at trial, but trial judge deter-
mined that no conflict or prejudice existed), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976).
22. United States v. Williams, 429 F.2d 158, 161 (8th Cir.) (defendants convicted of trans-
porting stolen vehicle in interstate commerce; where defense attorney suggested only that conflicts
of interest might arise, court did not err in failing to inform defendants of their right to individual
counsel or of the dangers in joint representation), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 947 (1970). Accord,
United States v. LaRiche, 549 F.2d 1088, 1095 (6th Cir.) (defendants convicted of conspiracy and
possession of stolen goods; hearing held on issue of joint representation, at which defendant
waived right to separate counsel; court has responsibility to inform defendants of problems with
multiple representation if real possibility of conflict arises), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987 (1977).
23. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 1973) (defense strategies not in best interest
of defendant, and no attempt made to distinguish defendant's involvement from that of codefend-
ants). 4ccord, United States v. DeYoung, 523 F.2d 807, 808-09 (3d Cir. 1975) (defendants con-
victed of wagering; no effort by counsel to show that defendant was absent from scene of betting
activity).
24. See note 19 supra.
25. See United States v. LaRiche, 549 F.2d 1088, 1095 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987
(1977); United States v. Kutas, 542 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 1073
(1977).
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showing of either suffices.21 "Prejudice" and "conflict of interests" are
sometimes used interchangeably,27 but they are distinct concepts.
"Conflict of interests" usually denotes significant variances in the code-
fendants' goals and defenses at trial, and the attorney's inability to rep-
resent fairly all those interests;2  "prejudice" usually refers to
detrimental effect on the defendant resulting from this conflict.29 Al-
though Glasser referred to a duty of the trial judge to defend the rights
of the accused,3" dispute still exists over the role of the trial judge in
resolving the joint representation issue.3 t Judicial interpretations of
26. See United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1055-56 (2d Cir. 1976) (judge made no
inquiry about potential conflict of interest; prejudice evidenced by one defendant's testimony con-
tradicting prior statement of other defendant); United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 3-5 (Ist Cir.
1972) (court suggests that in future trial courts should discuss with defendants, as early in trial as
possible, the risks of joint representation, and whether defense counsel informed defendants of
right to separate counsel).
27. See cases cited note 26 supra.
28. In Peterson v. Estelle, 446 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1971), a conflict arose when a prosecution
witness attributed an exculpatory statement to codefendant that inculpated defendant. In United
States v. Gougis, 374 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1967), a conflict appeared when defendant A denied
presence at a narcotics sale and claimed defendant B was in the house where the alleged sale
occurred. In Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F 2d 70 (4th Cir. 1966), a conflict arose when one defendant
denied guilt while another defendant admitted guilt and accused the first defendant of participa-
tion. State v. Land, 73 N.J. 24, 372 A.2d 297 (1977), found conflicting interests "[wihere the attor-
ney cannot or may not be able to pursue an unrestrained course of action in favor of a defendant
because he represents a codefendant." Id. at 30-31, 372 A.2d at 301. Cf Clark v. United States,
412 F.2d 491 (9th Cir.) (court found no conflict when defendants confessed guilt, neither defend-
ant denied the other's confession, and the statement of each was admitted as evidence only against
the alleged declarant), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 919 (1969). See also Note, Criminal Codefendants and
the Sixth Amendment: The Casefor Separate Counsel, 58 GEO. L.J. 369 (1969), which suggests
that conflict exists whenever "codefendants find themselves in adversary and combative posi-
tions." Id. at 377 (citing Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1966)).
29. "[Pirejudice means actual prejudice to a defendant's ability to present an effective de-
fense." United States v. Menke, 339 F. Supp. 1023, 1026 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Note, supra note 28:
"Most often, courts seem to use the term 'prejudice' to mean . . . the inherent result of such a
conflict [of interests]." Id. at 379-80 (citing Glavin v. United States, 396 F.2d 725, 727 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 926 (1968); Lebron v. United States, 229 F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 974 (1956)).
30. "Upon the trial judge rests the duty of seeing that the trial is conducted with solicitude for
the essential rights of the accused. . . The trial court should protect the right of an accused to
have the assistance of counsel." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. at 71.
31. The following cases impose on the judge an affirmative duty to investigate the possibility
of conflict and defendants' willingness to continue with the multiple representation: Abraham v.
United States, 549 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Georvassilis, 498 F.2d 883, 886
(6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Truglio, 493 F.2d 574, 579 (4th Cir. 1974); Hart v. Davenport, 478
F.2d 203, 122 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 5 (Ist Cir. 1972); Campbell v.
United States, 352 F.2d 359, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Skinner v. State, - Ind. App. -, -, 367
N.E.2d 19, 20 (1977); Mishler v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 676, 682 (Ky. 1977). See generally 6
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Glasser are thus irreconcilable on the issues of the showing required on
appeal to prove a conflict of interests (or prejudice to defendants) and
the need for an active, investigatory bench role. The courts agree,
seemingly, on one Glasser premise only: that representation of multi-
ple defendants by a single attorney may violate the right to effective
assistance of counsel.32
Joint representation is a subject of concern to the American Bar As-
sociation, whose Code of Professional Responsibility recommends
great care when instituting a joint representation proceeding. The at-
torney is urged to disclose to clients possible conflicts of interest;33 the
U. TOL. L. REV. 559 (1975). The following cases hold that the trial judge has little or no duty to
explore the matter: Robinson v. Housewright, 525 F.2d 988, 994 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Boudreaux, 502 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Christopher, 488 F.2d 849, 851 (9th
Cir. 1973); Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d 1071, 1073 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 964
(1969).
32. "Each year the confusion grows greater among the circuits. The end result is that the law
with regard to the sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel has developed
without cohesion of thought or unity of purpose." Hyman, Joint Representation of Mulltoe De-
fendants in a Criminal Trial- The Court's Headache, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 315, 319-20 (1977).
33. Ethical Consideration 5-14 provides:
Maintaining the independence of professional judgment required of a lawyer precludes
his acceptance or continuation of employment that will adversely affect his judgment on
behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client. This problem arises whenever a lawyer is asked
to represent two or more clients who may have differing interests, whether such interests
be conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-14 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
Ethical Consideration 5-15 provides:
If a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continue representation of multiple clients
having potentially differing interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility that his
judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts or continues the employ-
ment. He should resolve all doubts against the propriety of the representation. A lawyer
should never represent in litigation multiple clients with differing interests; and there are
few situations in which he would be justified in representing in litigation multiple clients
with potentially differing interests. If a lawyer accepted such employment and the inter-
ests did become actually differing, he would have to withdraw from employment with
likelihood of resulting hardship on the clients; and for this reason it is preferable that he
refuse the employment initially. On the other hand, there are many instances in which a
lawyer may properly serve multiple clients having potentially differing interests in mat-
ters not involving litigation. If the interests vary only slightly, it is generally likely that
the lawyer will not be subjected to an adverse influence and that he can retain his in-
dependent judgment on behalf of each client; and if the interests become differing, with-
drawal is less likely to have a disruptive effect upon the causes of his clients.
Id. EC 5-15 (footnotes omitted).
Ethical Consideration 5-17 provides:
Typically recurring situations involving potentially differing interests are those in which
a lawyer is asked to represent co-defendants in a criminal case, co-plaintiffs in a personal
injury case, an insured and his insurer, and beneficiaries of the estate of a decedent.
Whether a lawyer can fairly and adequately protect the interests of multiple clients in
these and similar situations depends upon an analysis of each case. In certain circum-
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major concern is the perversion of the attorney-client relationship. One
client's statements to an attorney cannot be assured complete confiden-
tiality because counsel must reveal such statements to codefendants in
preparing defenses. 34  Purely ethical considerations should thus be a
chief concern of the criminal lawyer representing multiple defendants.
The first portion of the Hollowav opinion explained that the failure
of the trial judge either to appoint separate counsel or to ascertain
whether separate counsel is necessary constitutes error if the defense
objects at trial. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, relied
extensively on Glasser to support his conclusion that such inaction de-
stances, there may exist little chance of the judgment of the lawyer being adversely af-
fected by the slight possibility that the interests will become actually differing; in other
circumstances, the chance of adverse effect upon his judgment is not unlikely.
Id EC 5-17 (footnotes omitted).
Disciplinary Rule 6-101 provides:
Failing to Act Competent/v
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not com-
petent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to
handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
Id. DR 6-101 (footnotes omitted).
34. ABA, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.5 (Tentative Draft 1970):
(a) At the earliest feasible opportunity defense counsel should disclose to the defend-
ant any interest in or connection with the case or any other matter that might be relevant
to the defendant's selection of a lawyer to represent him.
(b) Except for preliminary matters such as initial hearings or applications for bail, a
lawyer or lawyers who are associated in practice should not undertake to defend more
than one defendant in the same criminal case if the duty to one of the defendants may
conflict with the duty to another. The potential for conflict of interest in representing
multiple defendants is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to act for more
than one of several co-defendants except in unusual situations when, after careful inves-
tigation, it is clear that no conflict is likely to develop and when the several defendants
give an informed consent to such multiple representation.
(c) In accepting payment of fees by one person for the defense of another, a lawyer
should be careful to determine that he will not be confronted with a conflict of loyalty
since his entire loyalty is due the accused. When the fee is paid or guaranteed by a
person other than the accused, there should be an explicit understanding that the law-
yer's entire loyalty is to the accused who is his client and that the person who pays his fee
has no control of the case.
(d) It is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer to defend a criminal case in which the
lawyer's partner or other professional associate is the prosecutor or has participated in or
supervised the prosecution at any stage.
See also Uhl v. Municipal Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 526, 112 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1974), in which the
court held that when defense counsel informs the court of conflicting interests, the confidential
nature of such conflict need not be disclosed. Seegeneraly M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN
,N ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).
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prives defendants of the effective assistance of counsel." He asserted
that Glasser applies only when the defense counsel challenges the joint
representation at trial.3 6 If the request for separate counsel is based on
a conflict of interests, "most courts' 37 accede to an appropriate mo-
tion38 for the following reasons: a defense attorney is in a better posi-
tion to decide that a conflict of interests may arise,3 9 he is under an
obligation to inform the court on recognizing a conflict,40 and his state-
ments about clients' interests are "virtually made under oath."'" The
Court also suggested that a judge may be unable to fully explore a con-
flict based on confidential information received from clients because of
the attorney-client relationship.42 The Chief Justice, however, dis-
missed the assertion that defense counsel thereby has authority to rule
on the appointment of separate counsel. 43 A trial court can deal effec-
tively with ill-intentioned, misleading motions;44 ultimate discretion
rests with the trial judge, who may deny the motion if it is prompted by
delaying tactics.45
35. Of equal importance with the duty of the court to see that an accused has the assist-
ance of counsel is its duty to refrain from embarrassing counsel in the defense of an
accused by insisting, or indeed, even suggesting, that counsel undertake to concurrently rep-
resent interests which might divergefrom those of his first client, when the possiblio ofthat
divergence is brought home to the court.
435 U.S. at 484-85 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942)) (emphasis added in
Holloway).
36. "We read the Court's opinion in Glasser, however, as holding that whenever a trial court
improperly requires joint jrepresentation over timely objection reversal is automatic." Id. at 488
(citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942)). See notes 50 & 67 infra and accompa-
nying text.
37. 435 U.S. at 485.
38. Id. (citing Shuttle v. Smith, 296 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Vt. 1969); State v. Davis, 110 Ariz. 29,
514 P.2d 1025 (1973); State v. Brazile, 226 La. 254, 75 So. 2d 856 (1954)). Accord, Commonwealth
v. Russell, 406 Pa. 45, 176 A.2d 641 (1962).
39. 435 U.S. at 485 (citing State v. Davis, 110 Ariz. 29, 31, 514 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1973)),
40. Id. at 485-86.
41. Id. at 486 (citing State v. Brazile, 226 La. 254, 266, 75 So. 2d 856, 860-61 (1954)).
42. Id. at 487 n.ll. See also ABA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY, DR 4-101(B)
(1974):
Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third
person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
43. 435 U.S. at 486-87. See text accompanying note 56 infra.
44. 435 U.S. at 486 & n.10.
45. Id. at 486-87.
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The second portion of the opinion relied on Glasser to support the
Court's conclusion that the error requires automatic reversal of the
convictions.4" Petitioners need not show evidence of prejudice on ap-
peal if the trial court improperly imposed joint representation over
timely objection.47 The majority suggested that cases requiring proof
of prejudice in similar situations48 have misconstrued Glasser.49 The
refusal in Glasser to overturn the conviction of the codefendant sup-
ports the Holloway Court's interpretation of the case. The codefendant
in Glasser did not challenge the joint representation at trial and there-
tore could not receive the benefit of automatic reversal. 50
The majority refused to find harmless error in a violation of so fun-
damental a constitutional right as the effective assistance of counsel.5'
The danger in joint representation is that the attorney may necessarily
refrain from acting in a defendant's behalf because of obligations to the
other defendant. Inquiry into a claim of harmless error would involve
'unguided speculation."5  Prejudice-the effect of what counsel has
not done in such a case-is too difficult to prove.53
In dissent, Justice Powell, joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehn-
quist, found fault with the inaction of the trial judge, but deemed it
insufficient in itself to warrant automatic reversal. 4 Rather, they ar-
gued for the line of cases rejected by the majority, concluding that a
46. Id. at 488.
47. Id.
48. Id at 487-88 (citing United States %,. Woods, 544 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 969 (1977)). Accord DeConink v. State. 557 S.W.2d 698 (Mo. App. 1977).
49. 435 U.S. at 488. The Court in Glasser partially justified reversal of the conviction by
underscoring the insufficient evidence against Glasser. Further, the Court did not reverse the
,onviction of codefendant Kretske because there was no evidence that violation of Glasser's con-
sttutional rights prejudiced Kretske. 315 U S at 67, 75-77. Various courts have interpreted this
language to indicate that prejudice must be shown for reversal of the conviction. See notes 15-26
%upra.
50. See notes 15 & 36 supra; note 67 infra and accompanying text.
51. 435 U.S. at 489 (citing Chapman %,. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)). The Court has
delineated other vital rights whose denial is never harmless error. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U S. 335 (1963) (counsel); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (excluded evidence of coerced
,onlession), Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U-S. 510 (1927) (impartial judge). But see Fahy v. Connecticut,
375 U.S. X5 (1963) (not all trial errors violating Constitution require automatic reversal).
52. 435 U.S. at 491.
53. The Court identified two specific problem areas: the defense challenge to admission of
e idence prejudicial to one client, but favorable to another; and the minimization at sentencing of
the relative culpability of one defendant to demonstrate that of another. Id. at 490.
54. Id. at 492 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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showing of conflict of interests or prejudice is necessary for reversal.' -
The dissent contended that under the Court's opinion, the trial judge
may inquire only superficially into the nature of the conflict because of
the danger in disclosing confidential information;5 6 consequently this
limitation will result in automatically granting motions for separate
counsel.
The Holloway holding is narrowly limited to cases in which the de-
fense attorney makes a timely motion for separate counsel based on a
possible conflict of interests among the defendants he represents, and
the trial judge fails to explore the matter or to appoint other counsel.
Chief Justice Burger emphasized that the Court's holding speaks only
to cases in which defense counsel objects to the joint representation.57
The Court "need not resolve"58 the issues inherent in a showing of con-
flict of interest-prejudice and the affirmative duty of the trial
judge-because they are "commonly raised in challenges to joint repre-
sentation where-unlike this case-trial counsel does nothing to advise
the trial court of the actuality of possibility of a conflict."59 The major-
ity pointedly restricted its holding to a distinct minority of joint repre-
sentation cases.6.
The narrow holding unfortunately sidestepped several major difficul-
55. Id. at 495-96 (Powell, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 493 (Powell, J., dissenting). See text at notes 42-45 rpra for the majority's
response.
57. 433 U.S. at 483-84.
58. Id. at 484.
59. Id. at 483.
60. Of the.approximately sixty cases gleaned for this Comment, seven reflect objection at trial
by defense counsel or defendant: United States v. DeYoung, 523 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1975) (no
effort by counsel to differentiate among defendants' degrees of culpability); United States v. Ge-
orvassilis, 498 lF.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1974) (no basis for new trial although codefendant had strong
defense inconsistent with that of defendant); United States v. Williams, 429 F.2d 158 (8th Cir.)
(attorney suggested possibility of conflict in pre-trial hearing), cer. denied, 400 U.S. 947 (1970);
United States v.;Burkeen, 355 F.2d 241 (6th Cir.) (no conflict of interest where defendant seeking
separate counsel insisted on right to conduct own defense with aid of court-appointed counsel
when necessary), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 957 (1966); United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316 (2d Cir.)
(defendant not prejudiced by court's failure to adjourn trial because of counsel's illness and by
subsequent assignment of codefendant's counsel to defendant, when replacement counsel selected
by defendant demanded two-month continuance), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964); United States
v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963) (retained counsel absent due to illness; appointed interim
counsel sufficed, although two defendants expressed intermittent desires for separate counsel);
Noble v. Eicher 143 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (denial by court of right to counsel defeats juris-
diction of court-to renderjudgm6nt of conviction). Each of the cases cited above required a show-
ing of prejudice on appeal; none suggested the Holloway allowance of automatic reversal,
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ties debated in the courts. First, the Court failed to explain the mean-
ing of "timely objection,"'' 6 and the specific procedures the trial judge
should employ in probing the attorney.62 Second, the majority deliber-
ately neglected to address the difficulties in waiver of the right to effec-
tive counsel, an issue at the heart of joint representation.6 3 Third, the
significance, if any, of retained as opposed to appointed counsel went
unexamined. 4 Lastly, the Court failed to address the questions
presented by a valid midtrial motion for separate counsel-should the
trial be delayed, or a mistrial be declared and a new attorney given
time to prepare the case?65 Although resolution of these issues was not
necessary to the decision, discussion in dicta would have helped guide
courts in the critical and disputed areas of the proof of conflict of inter-
ests, the duty of the trial judge, and the assertion of a constitutional
right in opposition to the lawyer-client privilege.
Holloway will directly affect only those cases in which the defense
attorney challenges the joint representation. If, however, the trial judge
has an obligation to "protect the right of an accused to have the assist-
61. 435 U.S. at 488.
62. Id. at 487. See also United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975), which suggests
a meticulous dialogue akin to that pursued in relation to a guilty plea under FED. R. CR51. P. 11.
The court indicates that federal trial judges should
seek to elicit a narrative response from each defendant that he has been advised of his
right to effective representation, that he understands the details of his attorney's possible
conflict of interest. . . , that he has discussed the matter with his attorney ... and that
he voluntarily waives his Sixth Amendment protections.
517 F.2d at 278. But see notes 34 & 44 supra and accompanying text.
63. See 435 U.S. at 483. The Chief Justice indicated that because the prosecution did not
raise the issue of waiver, the Court would not address it. Id. at 483 n.5. See generally United
States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.
1976); Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973); Hyman, supra note 32, at 330-34.
64. See generally United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 104 (8th Cir. 1977) (no difference
between retained and appointed counsel), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978); United States v. Fos-
ter, 469 F.2d 1, 5 (lst Cir. 1972) (retained and appointed counsel of equal standing for joint repre-
sentation purposes); Larry Buffalo Chief v. South Dakota, 425 F.2d 271, 279 (8th Cir. 1970)
(immaterial whether counsel was appointed by court or selected by accused, in absence of facts
showing a waiver of the right); Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(indigents may be prejudiced in absence of affordable retained counsel, and thus there is no lesser
right to separate counsel when defendants are indigent); Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d 355, 359
(6th Cir. 1954) (immaterial whether counsel appointed or retained); Holland v. Boles, 225 F.
Supp. 863. 865-66 (N.D. W. Va. 1963) (irrelevant whether counsel retained or court-appointed).
65. 435 U.S. at 495 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting). See generally Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d
273, 275-76 (1st Cir. 1976) (undue trial delay proper justification for court to deny appointment of
a particular attorney desired by defendant); United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 335 (2d Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964).
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ance of counsel," 66 a defense objection should be unnecessary to trigger
a trial level investigation. The Holloway Court makes timely objection
the crucial element, relying on an unusual interpretation of Glasser. 7
Since the "decision goes well beyond the limits of Glasser,'' 61 the ma-
jority could have rejected that technical distinction and shaped the de-
cision to aid defendants whose counsel did not object at trial by placing
a nondelegable, absolute duty on the judge to solve the quandary of
multiple representation at the trial level.69 In this way the substantive
constitutional question would not arise on appeal, and only the discre-
tion of the trial judge would be in question.7 ° In placing the onus on
66. 435 U.S. at 484 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. at 71).
67. The Court uses Glasser to support its position that reversal due to joint representation is
unavailable unless counsel objects at trial. "The Court's refusal to reverse Kretske's conviction is
not contrary to this interpretation of Glasser. Kretske did not raise his own Sixth Amendment
challenge to the joint representation." Id. at 489. See notes 15 & 36 supra and accompanying
text; text accompanying note 50 supra. The at-trial objection was not crucial to Glasser, in which
the Court focused on the injury to the defendant.
It is questionable whether Glasser's objection to the appointment of his counsel, Stewart, to
represent his codefendant would be sufficient to withstand the tests posed in Hollowav. The trial
judge suggested that Stewart represent Kretske when Kretske expressed dissatisfaction with his
own attorney. Both Stewart and Glasser originally objected. Stewart suggested the danger of
guilt by association. Glasser stated, "if a defendant who has a lawyer representing him is allowed
to enter an objection, I would like to enter my objection. I would like to have my own lawyer
representing me." 315 U.S. at 69. The court then refused to appoint Stewart to represent Kretske.
After a short consultation the parties apparently changed their minds. Kretske and Stewart an-
nounced their agreement to the court appointment, and Glasser remained silent. Id. at 69-70. As
Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted in dissent, Glasser, a former Assistant United States Attorney, made
no claim at trial that his counsel was ineffective. Id. at 88-91. In his opinion Glasser failed to
make a timely objection to the appointment. The Holloway Court's unusual reading of the facts in
Glasser, stressing the timeliness of motions, thus became precedent for a rule mandating at-trial
objections. Holloway is the first case to read Glasser in such a strict manner. See note 60 suplra.
68. 435 U.S. at 492.
69. As noted in United States v. Williams, 429 F.2d 158 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 947
(1970):
Assignment of one attorney to represent two or more codefendants should never be
made routinely or indiscriminately. To the contrary, where there are two or more de-
fendants the trial judge should, before appointing the same attorney to represent them,
conduct a careful inquiry and satisfy himself that no conflict of interest is likely to result
and that the parties have no valid objection. This course is dictated because the possibil-
ity of a conflict of interest between two defendants always exists to some extent, even if it
be only in regard to the manner in which their defense is presented.
Id. at 161.
70. Seegenerally United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1977) (responsibil-
ity for avoiding risks of conflict from joint representation lies heavily with both trial court and
counsel), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978); Morgan v. United States, 396 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir.
1968) (judge should exercise extreme care before allowing joint representation, and should con-
duct inquiry to determine whether conflict exists); Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123, 125-26
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the judge instead of on the attorney, the Court still could have decided
Holloway on its facts7' and obviated the continual jockeying in other
courts on the issue of proof on appeal of prejudice and conflict of inter-
ests. Because the sixth amendment right to effective counsel is "basic to
a fair trial,"7 2 and the dangers of joint representation are so awesome,73
the Supreme Court should have molded more comprehensive protec-
tion for the defendant.
Holloway's value lies in its clarification of Glasser74 and its antici-
pated effect of fueling the growing judicial awareness of the pitfalls in
multiple representation. Unfortunately, Holloway lacks the vitality of
a bolder decision,76 and thus likely will not enjoy wide application.77
(D.C. Cir, 1967) (burden on judge to decide before trial whether separate counsel for codefendants
is required). See also United States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d 721, 728 (10th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Alberti, 470 F.2d 878, 881-82 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 919 (1973); United
States v. Liddy, 348 F. Supp. 198, 200 (D.D.C. 1972); State v. Olsen, - Minn. -258 N.W.2d 898
(1977). An automatic hearing may "serve as a means of promoting effective judicial administra-
tion by providing a meaningful and independent basis upon which the trial or appellate court may
make an independent assessment of the voluntariness of the waiver of such a right." Id. at 907.
But see United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1975) (affirmative judicial inquiry not
required by the sixth amendment or Glasser). See generaly Cole, Timefor a Change: Multiple
Representation Should be Stopped, 2 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 149 (1976).
71, "In this case the trial court simply failed to take adequate steps in response to the re-
peated motions, objections, and representations made to it .... " 435 U.S. at 487.
72. Id. at 489 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)).
73 435 U.S. at 489-90.
74. Id. at 488-89.
75. See note 57 supra and accompanying text. See also Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d
359 (D.C. Cir. 1965); 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(b) (1976). A noteworthy amendment to rule 44 of the
FED, R. CRIM. P., proposed by the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, states:
(c) Joint Representation. Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly
charged pursuant to Rule 8(b) or have been joined for trial pursuant to Rule 13, and are
represented by the same retained or assigned counsel or by retained or assigned counsel
who are associated in the practice of law, the court shall promptly inquire with respect to
such joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of his right to the
effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. Unless it appears that
there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall take
such measures as may be appropriate to protect each defendant's right to counsel.
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 82 (1978). reprinted in advance sheet to 98 S. Ct. 1123-1290 (May 1, 1978).
76. Perhaps any decision in the joint representation area is an encouraging stride. The
Supreme Court has in the past sidestepped confrontation of the Holloway-Glasser issues. See
Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250 (1972), in which the Court decided that withdrawal of a guilty
plea obviated any discussion of the state court's finding that no conflict of interest existed between
the defendants. Id. at 256-57.
77. Hollowars narrow scope is reflected in the treatment it has received in subsequent cases.
Courts have cited it to support ancillary points, noting that Holloway is controlling only when the
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The Supreme Court faced an important constitutional problem, but
disappointed courts still awaiting a conclusive path through the maze
of joint representation.
defense objects at trial. See United States v. Steele, 576 F.2d 11, 112 (6th Cir.) (Sixth Circuit
read Holloway to not hold that the sixth amendment is violated per se when trial judge fails to
inquire into the conflict of interest), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 313 (1978); Salomon v. LaVallee, 575
F.2d 1051, 1053-55 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1978) (if trial judge conducts no inquiry into conflict of interest,
burden of proof to show no prejudice is on prosecution).
[T]he [Holloway] Court pointedly refrained from commenting on the issues central to
this appeal: "how certain the reviewing court must be that the asserted conflict existed,
before it will conclude that the defendants were deprived of their right to the effective
assistance of counsel" and "the scope and nature of the affirmative duty of the trial judge
to assure that criminal defendants are not deprived of their right to the effective assist-
ance of counsel by joint representation of conflicting interests."
Id. at 1053 n.3 (quoting 435 U.S. at 483). See also United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200 (3d Cir.
1978), in which the court noted:
At the very least, before the district court permitted Siegal to choose between Visceglia
and Verna and to represent the latter. . .. the court should have made an on-the-record
disclosure of the potential conflicts to Verna. Nothing short of this will satisfy a review-
ing court that there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to the effective
assistance of an attorney. ...
Id. at 211. (defense counsel had entered appearance on behalf of both defendant and informant
codefendant, and was permitted to choose codefendant for trial representation without disclosing
to defendant the potential conflicts of interest); State v. Stevenson, 200 Neb. 624, 632-33, 264
N.W.2d 848, 852-53 (1978) (representation of two codefendants, when the confession of each was
used at trial to implicate the other defendant, suggests a conflict of interest, and trial court erred in
appointing one attorney to represent the codefendants).
The Eighth Circuit has cited Holloway for the premise that the judge should respect codefend-
ant's wishes to retain joint counsel in the absence of actual or potential conflicts. United States v.
Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 321-22 (8th Cir. 1978).
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